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I. Introduction
Our earliest records of human existence provide evidence that
people have always moved for environmental reasons.1 Moving
away from areas at environmental risk, whether because of drought
or sudden onset disasters, is a well-tested strategy people have used
to survive and to protect themselves from harm.2 In the past few
decades, evidence has mounted that the effects of anthropogenic
climate change will make certain parts of the planet uninhabitable
and that consequently large numbers of people will likely have to

† Elizabeth Ferris is research professor at the Institute for the Study of International
Migration, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
1 Amanda Mascarelli, Climate Swings Drove Early Humans out of Africa (and Back
Again), SAPIENS (Sept. 21, 2016), https://www.sapiens.org/evolution/early-humanmigration/ [https://perma.cc/53B2-68J2].
2 Ed Chen, Climate Induced Migration and Conflict: Historical Evidence, and
Likely
Future
Outlook,
SCIENCE
2.0
(Sept.
21,
2009),
https://www.science20.com/alchemist/blog/climate_induced_migration_and_conflict_his
torical_evidence_and_likely_future_outlook [https://perma.cc/GQ8A-BCDU].
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move.3
The very first report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change in 1990 predicted that one of the major consequences of
climate change will be the large-scale movement of people.4 In
particular climate scientists warn that a warming planet will mean
more frequent and longer droughts which damage livelihoods and
force large numbers of people to move in order to survive.5 More
frequent and more intense sudden-onset disasters will displace
people.6 Sea level rise and changing weather patterns are already
leading to coastal and riverine erosion, ocean acidification, higher
king tides, and saltwater intrusion into freshwater supplies.7
Additionally, there is evidence that well-intentioned mitigation
efforts to keep climate change in check by investing in renewable
energies, protecting forests, and conserving habitats are causing
further displacement—compelling people to leave their homes and
livelihoods.8
However, while there has long been a consensus that the effects
of climate change will increase mobility,9 there is little conclusive
evidence on when, how, who, where, or how many people will
move. Dire warnings of the potential for climate change to displace
tens of millions or even hundreds of millions of people seem to have
given way to the realization that the relationship between migration
and climate change is a complex process influenced by factors that
do not lend themselves well to estimates generated by statistical

3 OLI BROWN, CLIMATE CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION: OBSERVATIONS,
PROJECTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS (2007).
4 See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
IPCC SCIENTIFIC ASSESSMENT (J.T. Houghton et al. eds.,1990).
5 Chen, supra note 2.
6 Lisa Lim Ah Ken, Migration, Environment and Climate Change: What’s New, and
What’s
True,
LANDSCAPE
NEWS
(Nov.
1,
2018),
https://news.globallandscapesforum.org/viewpoint/migration-environment-and-climatechange-whats-new-and-whats-true/ [https://perma.cc/8GRZ-HGBZ].
7 See Mcleod et al., A Blueprint for Blue Carbon: Toward an Improved
Understanding of the role of Vegetated Coastal Habitats in Sequestering CO2, THE
ECONOLOGICAL
SOC’Y
OF
AM.
(Jan.
20,
2011),
https://esajournals.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1890/110004
[https://perma.cc/5PLF-NSUS].
8 See Sara Vigil, Displacement as a Consequence of Climate Change Mitigation
Policies, 49 FORCED MIGRATION REV. 43, 43–44 (2015).
9 BROWN, supra note 3.
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projections and models.10
There are serious difficulties in conceptualizing or coming up
with a term to characterize those who move because of the effects
of climate change.11 A particular challenge in assessing the
likelihood that people will move because of climate change is the
multi-causal nature of migration. People move for a variety of
reasons; for example, they move in search of livelihoods and better
opportunities, because of conflict and persecution, and because they
can no longer survive where they are.12 The 2011 Foresight Report
looks at macro factors that lead people to move, including
economic, environmental, demographic, political, and social
factors, but also considers micro factors (such as gender, age,
education, and wealth).13 In addition, there are intervening factors
such as the existing legal framework, the cost of moving, and social
networks at play; the intersection of all of these factors goes into an
individual’s decision to move or to stay.14 For example, the same
environmental pressures may lead a young healthy man to decide to
move to another country while an elderly woman with disabilities
may decide to remain where she lives. After a storm destroys
housing, one person with relatives in a nearby city may decide to
move, whereas another person, facing similar destruction but not
able to rely on social networks, may have no choice but to remain
where she is. A well-to-do homeowner in New Jersey may decide
to move before repeated flooding destroys all of his assets while a
poorer person living nearby may have no option but to remain in
place. Environmental factors always interact with other factors in
decision-making about migration.
10 See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE
CHANGE (2006); RACHEL BAIRD, HUMAN TIDE: THE REAL MIGRATION CRISIS, A CHRISTIAN
AID REPORT (2007); ROGER ZETTER, PROTECTING ENVIRONMENTALLY DISPLACED PEOPLE:
DEVELOPING THE CAPACITY OF LEGAL AND NORMATIVE FRAMEWORKS (2011); JANE
MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2012);
BROWN, supra note 3; Koko Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration:
Governance Challenges, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 402 (2010); UK GOV’T OFF. FOR
SCI., FORESIGHT: MIGRATION AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FUTURE
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES (2011).
11 See, e.g., Elizabeth Keyes, Environment Refugees? Rethinking What’s in a Name,
44 N.C. J. INT’L L. 461, 463 (2019) (discussing how climate change has a varied impact
on migration and spans a broad array of migration choices).
12 See Ken, supra note 6.
13 UK GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., supra note 10, at 12.
14 See id. at 11.
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It is thus difficult to come up with accepted terminology for
people who move in some measure because of environmental
reasons, much less because of climate change.15 A second challenge
is that the science is not yet sufficiently developed to determine the
extent to which climate change is responsible for a particular
sudden-onset event.16 While it is clear that climate change is
changing patterns of sudden-onset disasters, leading to more intense
and more frequent storms, we can still not yet say with any degree
of certainty, for example, that Hurricane Harvey was caused by
climate change.17 Thus, the terms “climate migrants,” “climate
displaced,” or “climate refugees”18 are not straightforward. This
may become clearer with recent advances in attribution science,
where scientists are beginning to use sophisticated models to
attribute the likelihood that any one weather event is the result of
human-induced climate change.19
A third difficulty in terminology relates to our present
international legal system for mobility which is based on sharp
distinctions along two dimensions.
Those who cross an
international border are treated differently than those who remain
within their borders.20 Most of those moving because of the effects
of climate change are expected to remain within the borders of their
countries—and thus are either internal migrants or internally
displaced persons.21 People who cross international borders are
considered to be either international migrants or refugees,22 but
neither category applies very well to those who move for
See Keyes, supra note 11, at 463–67.
See SARAH OPITZ STAPLETON, ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND
DISPLACEMENT: THE NEED FOR A RISK-INFORMED AND COHERENT APPROACH (2017).
17 See Matt McGrath, Hurricane Harvey: The Link to Climate Change, BBC NEWS
(Aug.
29,
2017),
https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-41082668
[https://perma.cc/C54W-547E].
18 See Tim McDonnell, The Refugees the World Barely Pays Attention To, NPR (June
20,
2018),
https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2018/06/20/621782275/therefugees-that-the-world-barely-pays-attention-to [https://perma.cc/KQ4X-J5NQ].
19 See Sarah Kaplan & Angela Fritz, Climate Change Was Behind 15 Weather
Disasters
in
2017,
WASH.
POST
(Dec.
12,
2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/science/2018/12/10/climate-change-was-behindweather-disasters/?utm_term=.c04dfd4473ab [https://perma.cc/9H9K-2LKN].
20 WORLD BANK GROUP, GROUNDSWELL: PREPARING FOR INTERNAL CLIMATE
MIGRATION (Kanta Kumari Rigaud et al. eds., 2018) [hereinafter GROUNDSWELL REPORT].
21 Id.
22 Id.
15
16
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environmental reasons. Under international law, there is a clear
legal distinction between those who are forced to move because of
persecution and conflict (considered to be refugees) and those who
choose to move voluntarily for a range of reasons (considered to be
migrants).23
The international refugee and migration regimes are very
different animals. But neither offers much to those who leave
primarily because of environmental change, including climate
change. The definition of refugee as enshrined in the 1951
Convention includes five grounds for a refugee claim: persecution
on the basis of race, religion, nationality, membership in a social
group, and political opinion.24 More generally, refugees are
considered to be those who cannot avail themselves of the
protection of their governments.25 Courts have held persons seeking
protection in another country because of the effects of climate
change are not refugees under the U.N. Convention.26 Moreover,
legal experts specialized in refugee law warn against efforts to
broaden the category of refugees, fearing that such a move could
weaken an already over-stretched system.27 International migration
law is rooted in international human rights law,28 and indeed people
do not lose their rights when they migrate, including those who
migrate for mainly environmental reasons.
But beyond
international human rights law, the existing normative frameworks
in the migration regime focus mainly on migrant workers and do not
specifically apply to those who leave their country because of the

23 Adrian Edwards, UNHCR viewpoint: ‘Refugee’ or ‘migrant’ – Which is right?,
U.N.
HIGH
COMMISSIONER
FOR
REFUGEES
(July
11,
2016),
https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/55df0e556/unhcr-viewpoint-refugee-migrantright.html [https://perma.cc/59S4-MMF6].
24
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T 6223, 189
U.N.T.S. 137.
25 Id.
26 See Gill Bonnett, Climate Change Refugee Cases Rejected, RADIO N.Z. (Oct. 24,
2017), https://www.radionz.co.nz/news/national/342280/climate-change-refugee-casesrejected [https://perma.cc/BNF3-XJUM].
27 See Jane McAdam, Seven Reasons the UN Refugee Convention Should Not Include
‘Climate
Refugees,’
SYDNEY
MORNING
HERALD
(June
6,
2017),
https://www.smh.com.au/opinion/seven-reasons-the-un-refugee-convention-should-notinclude-climate-refugees-20170606-gwl8b4.html [https://perma.cc/CCE6-WKYQ].
28 See MASSIMO FRIGO, MIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
(Róisín Pillay eds., Priyamvada Yarnell trans., 2014).
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effects of climate change.29
For the first time, in 2010 the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change’s meeting in Cancun referred to
mobility as a form of adaptation to climate change and
recommended that further work be done in the areas of migration
(presumed to be voluntary), displacement (forced movement), and
planned relocations (when a government resettles a community in
order to protect them from the effects of climate change).30 There
has been considerable research on the first two of these, including
major institutional efforts by the European Union, the U.K.’s
Foresight Study, the International Organization for Migration
(“IOM”), and the Platform on Disaster Displacement.31 Less work
has been done on planned relocations, perhaps for the
understandable reason that this is considered as a last resort, and
indeed, existing research indicates that such planned relocations are
fraught with difficulties.32
For these reasons, it has been difficult to reach common
understanding—and even basic definitions—among those working
in the area of climate change mobility. There is no consensus on
terminology or on how to deal with the multi-causal nature of
movements.33 Nor are there widely-accepted estimates of the
number of people likely to move.34 It has also been complicated by
policy-makers and researchers who approach the issue from very

29 See International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members
of their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Concerning Migration for
Employment, Jan. 22, 1952, 120 U.N.T.S. 71; Migrant Workers (Supplementary
Provisions) Convention, June 24, 1975, I.L.O No. 143 (entered into force Dec. 9, 1978).
30 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Cancun Agreements: Outcome
of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Cooperative Action under the
Convention, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2010/7 (Dec. 10, 2011) [hereinafter Cancun
Agreements].
31 See EACH-FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND FORCED MIGRATION SCENARIOS
FINAL REPORT SUMMARY (2012); EACH-FOR ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE AND FORCED
MIGRATION SCENARIOS D.3.4. SYNTHESIS REPORT (2009); UK GOV’T OFF. FOR SCI., supra
note 10; ENV’T MIGRATION PORTAL, https://environmentalmigration.iom.int/
[https://perma.cc/B3BB-2CDW];
PLATFORM
ON
DISASTER
DISPLACEMENT,
https://disasterdisplacement.org/ [perma.cc/A8NT-FRGH].
32 For research and other materials on planned relocations, see Planned Relocations,
INST. FOR THE STUDY OF INT’L MIGRATION, https://isim.georgetown.edu/PlannedRelocations (last visited on Apr. 15, 2019).
33 See Ken, supra note 6.
34 Id.
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different backgrounds, using different assumptions and
methodologies. For example, marine scientists, refugee lawyers,
disaster management officials, security analysts, and environmental
lawyers all approach the issue of climate change mobility
differently.35 It is thus understandable, as discussed further below,
that there has been more progress and more consensus among those
focusing on disaster displacement, particularly sudden-onset
disasters,36 than on climate-change mobility. The Internal
Displacement Monitoring Centre has been collecting data on the
number of people displaced by sudden-onset disasters and has found
that on average 24.3 million people per year are displaced by
sudden-onset disasters.37
Two other political factors complicate efforts to develop new
international standards or agreements to respond to those who move
because of the effects of climate change. First, there is presently
little international appetite for assuming new international
obligations or developing new international law.38 The big
international successes of the last few years—the Paris Agreement,
the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, Agenda 2030
for Sustainable Development and, most recently, the Global
Compact for Migration—are all aspirational frameworks that
depend on voluntary compliance rather than legal obligations.39
Secondly, in spite of these U.N. “successes,” this is a difficult time
for multilateralism and collective action on pressing global issues
writ large. The liberal rules-based order that has largely provided
stability and prosperity since World War II is being eroded due to
changes in U.S. leadership.40 U.S. policy appears to have moved
See id. (discussing lack of consensus across the scientific and legal fields).
See id. (stating that the International Organization for Migration only added a
climate change migration division in 2015).
37 INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT MONITORING CTR., GLOBAL REPORT ON INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT
(2017),
http://www.internaldisplacement.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/20170522-GRID.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9JCJ-M8PK].
38 See Kristen E. Boon, Disaster Displacement: Gaps in International Norms,
OPINIOJURIS (Apr. 15, 2014), http://opiniojuris.org/2014/04/15/disaster-displacementgaps-international-norms/ [https://perma.cc/ZLX9-HNPH].
39 See Dana Nuccitelli, Climate Scientists Debate a Flaw in the Paris Agreement,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 29, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climateconsensus-97-per-cent/2018/mar/28/climate-scientists-debate-a-flaw-in-the-parisclimate-agreement [https://perma.cc/8FX4-QEH2].
40 ROBERT KAGAN, THE JUNGLE GROWS BACK: AMERICA AND OUR IMPERILED WORLD
35
36
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away from seeing strong multilateral institutions as essential for
U.S. national interests toward a worldview emphasizing “America
First.”41
Moreover, the present xenophobic, anti-immigrant
climate42 makes it difficult to come up with any new global
framework which would make it easier, not harder, for people to
gain entry into other countries. Indeed, it has even been difficult to
mobilize support for accepting recognized refugees—witness the
sharp decline in U.S. resettlement places, from 110,000 under
President Obama to 40,000 under the Trump administration.43
For these reasons, it is highly unlikely that the international
community will develop and adopt a comprehensive legal
framework in the near future for those who move because of the
effects of climate change. A number of such draft treaties and
agreements exist, but they are likely to remain an issue for
discussion among academics and lawyers rather than serving as a
basis for political action.44
This Article now considers alternative ways of using existing
legal instruments to respond to those who are presently moving and
who will move in the future because of the effects of climate change,
beginning with people who move within the borders of their own
countries. This includes using the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement and supporting national-level efforts to deal with
those moving because of climate change.
II. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement
The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (“the
Principles or Guiding Principles”), developed in 1998 and affirmed
by the World Summit of 2005, explicitly apply to those displaced
by disasters as well as by conflict.45 The Principles were developed
17 (2018).
41 See id.
42 See Derek Thompson, How Immigration Became So Controversial, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/02/why-immigrationdivides/552125/ [https://perma.cc/4LMY-2MBQ].
43 Dara Lind, Trump Slashed Refugee Levels this Year. For 2019, He’s Slashing
Them
Even
Further,
VOX
(Sep.
18,
2018),
https://www.vox.com/2018/9/17/17871874/refugee-news-record-history-asylum
[https://perma.cc/D5K6-U66R].
44 See Katrina Wyman, Responses to Climate Migration, 37 HARV. ENVTL L. REV.
167, 216 (2013).
45 U.N. Secretary-General, U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, U.N.
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to respond to gaps in existing international law and to provide
appropriate guidance to national authorities in responding to those
who are compelled to move elsewhere in their own countries.46 The
Principles were developed by legal experts, convened by Francis
Deng, then-Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally
Displaced Persons (“IDPs”).47 The 30 principles were synthesized
and compiled from existing hard law particularly applicable to
IDPs.48 Thus, the Convention on the Rights of the Child affirms that
all children have the right to education,49 and the Principles state
that all internally displaced children have the right to education.50
While not in itself a legally binding document, because the
Guiding Principles are based on and draw out the relevant norms of
international human rights and humanitarian law (and by analogy,
refugee law),51 they have enjoyed broad support.52 Central to the
Guiding Principles is the affirmation that states bear the primary
responsibility for protection of people, both citizens and habitual
residents within their area of jurisdiction.53 They recognize that
individuals have a right to protection from arbitrary displacement as
well as to assistance and protection when they are displaced.54
Moreover, the Principles highlight the right to find durable
solutions to displacement, return or settlement in the place of
displacement, or in another part of the country.55
The Guiding Principles are often considered to be one of the
most effective soft law mechanisms.56 Now available in more than
Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Ad.2 (1998) [hereinafter Guiding Principles].
46 See id.
47 Id. at 7.
48 Id.
49 Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
50 Guiding Principles, supra note 45.
51 See id. at intro. (“Although they do not constitute a binding instrument, these
Principles reflect and are consistent with international human rights and humanitarian law
and analogous refugee law.”).
52 See Roberta Cohen, The Guiding Principles: How Do They Support IDP Response
Strategies, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION (Nov. 9, 2001), https://www.brookings.edu/on-therecord/the-guiding-principles-how-do-they-support-idp-response-strategies/
[https://perma.cc/PB6Z-S2HF].
53 Guiding Principles, supra note 45.
54 Id. at principles 3, 6.
55 Id. at principle 28.
56 Cohen, supra note 52.
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60 languages, they have been used by many governments as the
basis for the development of national laws and policies on IDPs and
have been incorporated into policies and guidelines for
humanitarian actors.57 They have been useful to governments
responding to large-scale internal displacement in providing
concrete guidance as to their responsibilities.58
The Guiding Principles have been successful in providing a
normative framework that has undoubtedly protected the rights of
some IDPs in many situations.59 Presently some 40 governments
have developed national laws and policies on IDPs—although not
all of these are based on the Guiding Principles.60 Even when
governments have developed laws, however, implementation has
usually been lacking. Phil Orchard has found that almost a third of
these policies have not been implemented at all.61 With a few
exceptions, even when governments have developed laws and
policies on IDPs, the almost exclusive focus has been on those
displaced by conflict, and there is as yet only one country that has
incorporated them into a national policy on climate change
displacement (Vanuatu, discussed further below).62 For example,
Kenya has developed strong legislation to respond to conflictinduced displacement, but has not applied these policies to those
displaced by drought.63 Moreover, in recent years, there has been
concern that the issue of internal displacement is falling off the
international agenda. 64 For example, neither of the two Global
Compacts adopted in 2018 (one on Refugees and the other on Safe,
Orderly and Regular Migration) made more than a passing reference
to internal displacement.65
57 PHIL ORCHARD, PROTECTING THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED: RHETORIC AND
REALITY (2019).
58 See id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 ORCHARD, supra note 57.
62 See id.
63 Dulo Nyaro, Assessing the Evidence: Migration, Environment, and Climate
Change
in
Kenya,
INT’L
ORG.
FOR
MIGRATION
101–02
(2016),
https://gmdac.iom.int/MECLEP-Assessment-Kenya [https://perma.cc/9QHL-BY4C].
64 ELIZABETH FERRIS, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, TEN YEARS AFTER HUMANITARIAN
REFORM: HOW HAVE INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS FARED? 3 (2015),
https://www.refworld.org/docid/54cb8e484.html [https://perma.cc/3RQB-XDGT].
65 See id.
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One of the more concrete indicators of the success of the
Guiding Principles has been the fact that they have directly led to
the formulation of the world’s first binding regional instrument on
internal displacement.66 The African Union Convention on
Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
(the Kampala Convention) was adopted by the African Union in
2009 and entered into force in 2012.67 This Convention built on the
Great Lakes Protocols.68 The Kampala Convention is the first
binding international treaty to acknowledge climate change as a
driver of displacement.69 Unlike the Guiding Principles, the
Convention is a formal, legally binding convention that establishes
the obligations of states to prevent displacement, to protect and
assist those who have been displaced, and to support solutions to
displacement.70 The Convention spells out the obligation of states
to prevent displacement by, among other actions, instituting early
warning systems and developing disaster risk reduction strategies.71
States parties are also required to protect and assist those displaced
by disasters, including by climate change.72 Finally, states parties
are liable to make reparations to IDPs for damages when “a State
Party refrains from protecting and assisting internally displaced
persons in the event of natural disasters.”73 The African Union and
the states parties to the Convention are still working on
implementation of the Convention and its domestication into
appropriate legal frameworks at the national level.74 In spite of the
66 African Union, Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa (Kampala Convention), adopted on Oct. 23, 2009 49 I.L.M.
86 [hereinafter Kampala Convention].
67 Id.
68 International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, Protocol on the Protection
and Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Nov.
30, 2006).
69 Allehone M. Abebe, The Kampala Convention & Environmentally Induced
Displacement in Africa, IOM INTERSESSIONAL WORKSHOP ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
ENVIRONMENTAL
DEGRADATION
&
MIGRATION
(Mar.
29–30,
2011),
https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/microsites/IDM/workshops/cli
mate-change-2011/SessionIII-Paper-Allehone-Mulugeta-Abebe.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TXS-4QAP].
70 Id.
71 Kampala Convention, supra note 67, at art. 4(2).
72 Id. at art. 5(4).
73 Id. at art. 12(3).
74 Abebe, supra note 69.
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lack of progress on implementation, the Kampala Convention
stands as an important model for other regional organizations which
are likely to be confronted with the challenge of responding to those
who move because of the effects of climate change. This possibility
is discussed more fully later in this Article.
In sum, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement have
provided useful guidance for states and international organizations
in the development of policies and programs to protect and assist
people displaced within the borders of their countries. They stand
as the best legal guidance presently available for the vast majority
of those likely to be displaced by the effects of climate change.75
They have served as the normative framework for efforts by
international networks to establish operational guidelines for
responding to people displaced and otherwise affected by natural
disasters initiatives,76 which are discussed later in this Article.
As governments throughout the world are faced with the reality
of large-scale displacement within the borders of their countries,
they would be well-advised to consider incorporating the Guiding
Principles into their national laws and policies. Legal scholars
could be encouraged to provide additional guidance as to how this
framework could be interpreted into national law, particularly as it
relates to climate change. At the end of the day, most of those
displaced by the effects of climate change, who will remain within
the borders of their countries, will have to depend on national laws
and programs for protection and assistance. This applies to people
displaced in wealthy countries, such as the United States, as well as
those forced to leave their homes in small-island developing
countries and in the world’s great mega-cities located in vulnerable
coastal areas. We turn now to the level of national laws and policies
in consideration of normative guidance available to support those
who move because of the effects of climate change.
III. National-Level Policies
Although there is a growing body of research on the ways in
which climate change is leading both to greater migration and

75 INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, IOM FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING INTERNAL
DISPLACEMENT
2017
7
(2017),
https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/170829_IDP_Framework_Low
Res.pdf [https://perma.cc/4FS7-4U2L].
76 Id.
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displacement,77 there is a paucity of research on national policies on
environmental migration and displacement beyond disaster risk
reduction (DRR) measures aimed at increasing resilience (where
there is a substantial literature).78 Those few studies that look at the
policy dimension79 suggest the need to incorporate migration and
displacement into national development or climate change
adaptation and DRR plans, a point reaffirmed in the World Bank’s
2018 flagship report, Groundswell.80
Presently there is little information on whether migration is even
included in national and local climate change and disaster risk
reduction policies, and there is virtually no information on how
policies related to environmental migration were made.81 Nor is
there research on the impact of such policies to prevent or manage
migration.82 The reasons for this lack of research seems to be the
reluctance to consider migration as a response to the effects of
climate change,83 and focuses instead on measures to mitigate the
effects of climate change so that people are able to remain in place.
In looking at national level laws and policies, it seems that much
of the relevant work currently underway is taking place at the state
and local levels, which are the governments most likely to be
confronted with responding to environmental displacement—

77 BROOKINGS-LSE, PROJECT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT: CLIMATE CHANGE AND
INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT (2014), available at https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Climate-Change-and-Internal-Displacement-October-102014.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SV2-KK5R].
78 See INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION
AND
ENVIRONMENTAL
MIGRATION
(2009),
http://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/ddr_cca_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BWD8S5YT].
79 U.N. OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, DISASTER DISPLACEMENT: HOW TO
REDUCE RISK, ADDRESS IMPACTS AND STRENGTHEN RESILIENCE (2018), available at
https://www.unisdr.org/files/58821_disasterdisplacement05a.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A6M7-W7QX]; Adelle Thomas & Lisa Benjamin, Policies and
Mechanisms to Address Climate-Induced Migration and Displacement in Pacific and
Caribbean Small Island Developing States, 10 INT’L J. OF CLIMATE CHANGE STRATEGIES
AND MGMT. 86 (2018).
80 GROUNDSWELL REPORT, supra note 20.
81 Id. at xxv.
82 Id. at 185.
83 See Katrina Wyman, Responses to Climate Change, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 167,
172 (2013) (“It is also challenging to attribute a migration decision to climate change, as
migration decisions are a response to a combination of factors.”).
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sometimes with the support of national political institutions.84 Thus,
in the United States, the state of Louisiana’s efforts to relocate the
small community of Isle Jean Charles (which has lost 98% of its
physical territory in recent years to erosion, subsidence, and storm
surges) is being carried out with the support of the Department of
Housing and Urban Development.85
In Florida, municipalities have developed different programs to
respond to the threats posed by climate change. One significant
positive development is the establishment of the Southeast Florida
Regional Climate Change Compact, the first case of U.S. local
governments voluntarily coming together to adapt to climate change
on a regional scale.86 In 2010, four southeast Florida counties
created a compact to promote regional coordination of climate
adaptation: Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm Beach.87
Since then, they have expanded the compact to include nongovernmental organizations and various governmental actors such
as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.88 Working through the
compact, the four countries have developed a Regional Climate
Action Plan which includes 110 projects for resilience and
adaptation.89
One of the best examples of a national policy on displacement
caused by climate change is Vanuatu’s recent National Policy on
Climate Change and Disaster-Induced Displacement.90 This policy

84 See Coral Davenport & Campbell Robertson, Resettling the First American
‘Climate Refugees,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2016, at A1 (referencing the Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s $1 billion in grants to help communities adapt to
climate change).
85 Id.
86 See David L. Markell, Emerging Legal and Institutional Responses to Sea-Level
Rise in Florida and Beyond, 42 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2016); SYDNEY MENEES & JESSICA
GRANNIS, GEORGETOWN CLIMATE CENTER, LESSONS IN REGIONAL RESILIENCE: THE
SOUTHEAST FLORIDA REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT (2017), available at
https://www.georgetownclimate.org/files/report/GCC-Lessons-in-Regional-ResilienceSE_FL_Compact-Jan_2017-v2.pdf [https://perma.cc/V5Q2-PWM7].
87 SOUTHEAST FLORIDA REGIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE COMPACT COUNTIES, A REGION
RESPONDS TO A CHANGING CLIMATE: REGIONAL CLIMATE ACTION PLAN (2012),
http://www.southeastfloridaclimatecompact.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/regionalclimate-action-plan-final-ada-compliant.pdf [https://perma.cc/WB23-93G7].
88 Id. at 48.
89 See id. at 13.
90 See GOV’T OF VANUATU, NATIONAL POLICY ON CLIMATE CHANGE & DISASTERINDUCED
DISPLACEMENT
(2018),
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is based on the country’s own legal system (including respect for
traditional law and customary land arrangements) and incorporates
the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.91 It suggests
concrete ways of preventing, responding to, and resolving
displacement caused by climate change and disasters.92 It
recognizes the multi-causal nature of displacement, and the
importance of consulting with communities affected by
displacement.93 The policy proposes “twelve strategic priority areas
for action to ensure displacement and human mobility
considerations are mainstreamed into Vanuatu’s planning at
national, provincial and local levels.”94 The policy further identifies
specific objectives, actions to be taken, and the relevant ministries
and agencies charged with implementation and follow-up.95
Vanuatu’s policy stands as a model for other countries experiencing
or likely to experience displacement caused by disasters and the
effects of climate change. An interesting area for further research
and for the expertise of international lawyers is to analyze the extent
to which Vanuatu’s new policy can serve as a model for other
governments likely to experience large-scale displacement caused,
at least in part, by the effects of climate change.
The experience of international disaster law, pioneered by the
International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies
(“IFRC”), suggests the importance of legal preparedness in
preparing for disasters and indeed for the long-term effects of
climate change.96 IFRC suggests that governments are advised to
review their national policies on disaster management and ensure
that policies are in place before disasters strike.97 While the focus

https://www.iom.int/sites/default/files/press_release/file/iom-vanuatu-policy-climatechange-disaster-induced-displacement-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/CFF8-86YD].
91 See id. at 17.
92 See id. at 7.
93 Id.
94 See id. at 8.
95 See id. at 21 (listing various strategic areas and specifying the agencies to act).
96 See About the Disaster Law Programme, INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED
CRESCENT
SOC’YS
(2019),
http://www.ifrc.org/what-we-do/idrl/about-idrl/
[https://perma.cc/4RCH-9BQ5].
97 See INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC’YS, INTRODUCTION TO THE
GUIDELINES FOR THE DOMESTIC FACILITATION AND REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL
DISASTER
RELIEF
AND
INITIAL
RECOVERY
ASSISTANCE
16
(2011),
http://www.ifrc.org/PageFiles/41203/1205600-IDRL%20Guidelines-EN-LR%20(2).pdf
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of international disaster law is on immediate response (for example,
taking measures to ensure that in the event of an emergency,
customs offices will be expected to have longer opening hours and
that relief goods can receive expedited clearance),98 other factors
should be taken into consideration. The development of national
laws which could apply to those displaced by disasters and climate
change could include measures such as ensuring that displaced
children will have access to education even if they do not have their
school records or that the government will take action to ensure the
protection of property and other assets left behind after people are
displaced because of the effects of climate change.
IV. Planned Relocations
As noted above, in 2010 the Conference of Parties of the U.N.
Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”),
recognized that mobility may be an adaptation strategy for climate
change and called for further work on displacement, migration and
planned relocations.99
The Paris Agreement extended this
recognition and called for concrete recommendations to be
developed.100 While there has been considerable work on
displacement and migration,101 much less is known about planned
relocations. Although the need for them is likely to increase in the
coming years, there has been little guidance or statement of
principles to address planned relocations as a protection strategy in
response to the adverse effects of climate change. Development
induced displacement and resettlement have been extensively used
in the case of development projects,102 but their applicability in other
cases of climate change has received relatively little attention.
Recognizing this gap, from 2011–2015, the Brookings
Institution, Georgetown University, and United Nations High
[https://perma.cc/JU2A-2SPZ].
98 See id. at 20.
99 See Cancun Agreements, supra note 30.
100 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, ¶ 49 (Jan. 29, 2016).
101 See id. (requesting “expert bodies outside the Convention” and the Adaption
Committee and the Least Developed Countries Expert Group to continue their work on
displacement related to climate change).
102 See generally Chris de Wet, Improving Outcomes in Development-Induced
Displacement and Resettlement Projects, 24 FORCED MIGRATION REV. (2002) (discussing
Development-Induced Displacement and Resettlement Projects generally).

2019

CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION

441

Commissioner for Refugees (“UNHCR”) worked on planned
relocations, organizing meetings of both legal experts and
practitioners in Bellagio, San Remo and again in Bellagio in May
2015.103 The 2015 meeting drafted Guidance on Protecting People
through Planned Relocations from Disasters and Environmental
Change, including Climate Change as a guide for governments and
others when planned relocations are necessary to protect people
because of disasters and environmental change, including the
effects of climate change.104 This Guidance only applies to those
who are relocated within the borders of their countries. This is
likely to be the vast majority of people although there is
considerable interest in those communities that might have to be
relocated, at some point, to other countries.105
The Guidance was widely disseminated and also served as the
basis for the development of a Toolbox which lays out a number of
concrete ways to translate the principles into practice.106 The
Toolbox organizes its checklists into five essential categories,
including: (1) establishing and complying with an appropriate legal
framework; (2) understanding and addressing the needs and impacts
of Planned Relocations on affected populations; (3) providing
information to, undertaking consultation with, and ensuring the
participation of, affected populations; (4) understanding and
addressing complexities related to land issues; and (5) undertaking
103

See, e.g., THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ET AL., GUIDANCE ON PROTECTING PEOPLE

FROM DISASTERS AND ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE THROUGH PLANNED RELOCATION (2015),

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/GUIDANCE_PLANNEDRELOCATION_14-OCT-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/AY3Q-UJ5E]; DANIEL PETZ,
PLANNED RELOCATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF NATURAL DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE:
A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE (2015),
https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Brookings-Planned-Relocations-Annotated-Bibliography-June2015.pdf [ https://perma.cc/SX5F-JBRF]; THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION ET AL., PLANNED
RELOCATIONS, DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE: CONSOLIDATING GOOD PRACTICES AND
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE (2014) [hereinafter PLANNED RELOCATIONS, DISASTER AND
CLIMATE CHANGE], https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/PlannedRelocations-Disasters-and-Climate-Change-Report-March-2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3DUT-3ELD]; DANIEL PETZ, OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE AND
FRAMEWORKS RELEVANT TO PLANNED RELOCATIONS CAUSED BY NATURAL HAZARDS,
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE, AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2015), https://www.brookings.edu/wpcontent/uploads/2016/06/Brookings-Planned-Relocations-Framework-DPetz-June2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/RE65-PG5J].
104 Id.
105 See id.
106 PLANNED RELOCATIONS, DISASTER AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 103.
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monitoring and evaluation, and ensuring accountability.107 The
Toolbox further addresses the importance of making the decision
that a community must be relocated, developing a comprehensive
plan for the relocation and implementing the plan in a way that
respects the rights of all of those affected by the relocation,
including those who are relocated, the communities that receive
them and those that are left behind.108
This initiative thus provides a framework to support
governments and affected communities considering relocation of
entire communities. Such relocations are generally considered as a
last resort after other measures to enable communities to remain in
place.109 While some communities are proactively asking the
government for assistance in relocation,110 others, such as Del Mar,
California are actively resisting calls to at least consider relocations
as a form of adaptation to the effects of climate change in their
communities.111
Work in these three areas—the Guiding Principles on Internal
Displacement as a normative framework at the international level,
laws and policies developed at the national level, and preparing for
planned relocations,—offer guidance for those displaced internally
because of the effects of climate change.
We now turn to efforts to deal with international displacement
and migration, beginning with international refugee law, which as
noted above is not immediately relevant but where some related
efforts offer interesting possibilities.
V. Refugee Law
As noted above, refugee law in its current form will only cover
a very small group of people affected by climate change, those that
Id. at 4.
108 Id. at 6–7 (“Box 1.2. Basic Principles of Planned Relocations”).
109 Id. at 3.
110 See generally Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Community Relocations: Creating
an Adaptive Governance Framework Based in Human Rights Doctrine, 35 N.Y.U. REV.
OF L. & SOC. CHANGE 357 (2017) (discussing the steps taken by Federal, State, and Tribal
governments have taken to relocate Newtok, one of at least twelve small indigenous
communities in Alaska that need to relocate due to climate change).
111 Nathan Rott, ‘Retreat’ Is Not an Option as a California Beach Town Plans for
Rising Seas, NPR (Dec. 4, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/12/04/672285546/retreat-isnot-an-option-as-a-california-beach-town-plans-for-rising-seas [https://perma.cc/46NTXTBY].
107
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suffer from ensuing conflict, persecution, or a breakdown of public
order.112 It may be that climate change exacerbates conflict and that
as a result people flee across national borders; if they are fleeing
violence and persecution, they may be able to avail themselves of
protection under refugee law.113 There also may be cases where
people affected by disasters face discrimination on the basis of one
of the five protected grounds in the 1951 Convention114 and as a
consequence seek protection in other countries. In these cases,
people so displaced may be able to find protection under the refugee
convention.115
However, the Refugee Convention does not apply to those
whose main reason for flight is a deteriorating environment or the
effects of climate change.116 While some have suggested changing
the 1951 Refugee Convention to apply to such individuals,117 States
are suspicious of extending legal obligations to other categories of
displaced persons.118 Negotiating a new protocol or amendment to
the Refugee Convention is thus unlikely and were such negotiations
to occur, could prove counterproductive.
However, there are other areas where it may be possible to use
refugee law. Some regional instruments such as the 1969
Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention on the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa119 and the 1984 Cartagena
Declaration on Refugees120 have moved beyond the narrow
definition of the Geneva Convention. They acknowledge that

See Bonnett, supra note 26.
Caitlin Werrell & Francesco Femia, Climate Change Raises Conflict Concerns,
UNESCO COURIER (Feb. 2018), https://en.unesco.org/courier/2018-2/climate-changeraises-conflict-concerns [https://perma.cc/K2N5-6P78].
114 See Bonnett, supra note 26.
115 Id.
116 See Werrell & Femia, supra note 113.
117 See, e.g., Somini Sengupta, Climate Change is Driving People from Home. So
Why Don’t They Count as Refugees, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/21/climate/climate-refugees.html
[https://perma.cc/6WUD-J8LZ] (raising the question of whether the definition of refugee
ought to be revised to encompass climate migrants).
118 See id.
119 Organization of the African Unity (OAU), Convention Governing the Specific
Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, Sep. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45.
120 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, Colloquium on the International Protection of
Refugees in Central America, Mexico and Panama, 22 November 1984.
112
113
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international protection may be needed for events that “seriously
disturb public order” and thus potentially provide protection for
people displaced by circumstances accompanying disasters.121
More recently, the Brazil Plan of Action, adopted in December 2014
by 28 countries, explicitly mentions climate change as a challenge
to the region and calls on UNHCR to support the development of
national and regional policies to respond to those forced to move
because of climate change and disasters.122 There may be potential
in applying these regional instruments and encouraging the
development of similar instruments in other regions.
The concept of complementary protection, i.e. regional and
national norms for temporary or subsidiary protection, offers other
possibilities. This concept was developed to fill some protection
needs outside the 1951 Refugee Convention.123 An EU directive,
for instance, allows the establishment of temporary protection for
people facing generalized violations of human rights in their home
countries, although it has never been applied.124 Subsidiary
protection can be claimed in the EU when applicants face the risk
of serious harm such as indiscriminate violence in their home
countries.125 While neither of these measures explicitly references

121 Regional instruments such as the 1969 OAU Convention and the 1984 Cartagena
Declaration apply a wider definition of refugees that includes events which seriously
disturb public order, thus potentially encompassing disasters. This was used by some
states in the Horn of Africa during the 2011–12 droughts to admit people displaced from
Somalia, and by others in Latin America to grant asylum to Haitians displaced by the 2010
earthquake. Other Latin American states even found that Haitian asylum seekers had a
“well-founded fear of persecution by non-state actors that arose from the vacuum of
governmental authority after the earthquake.” See THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, AGENDA FOR
THE PROTECTION OF CROSS-BORDER DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 54 n.47 (2015).
122 See Regional Refugee Instruments & Related, Brazil Declaration: A Framework
for Cooperation and Regional Solidarity to Strengthen the International Protection of
Refugees, Displaced and Stateless Persons in Latin America and the Caribbean at 3–4,
Dec. 3, 2014, 989 U.N.T.S. 175.
123 See Angela Williams, Turning the Tide: Recognizing Climate Change Refugees in
International Law, L. & POL’Y 502, 513–14 (2008).
124 See Council Directive 2001/55, 2001 O.J. (EC) (directing “minimum standards for
giving temporary protection in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on
measures promoting a balance of efforts between Member States in receiving such persons
and bearing the consequences thereof”).
125 See Directive 2001/95, 2001 O.J. (EU) (directing standards for the qualification of
third-country nationals or stateless persons as beneficiaries of international protection, for
a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection, and for the
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climate-related risks, it may be that more intense disasters or
prolonged drought may increase the likelihood of generalized
human rights violations and indiscriminate violence and thus make
the regimes applicable.
However, as McAdam argues, the concept of complementary
protection would “need to be substantially developed” before it
could become more generally applicable to climate change-related
displacement.126 Even if such measures were applied to those
leaving their countries for climate change-related reasons, they
usually provide only temporary protection and as the norms often
reflect the lowest common denominator, they tend to establish weak
protection standards.127 Although far from perfect, a further area for
legal experts would be to examine the extent to which such
measures could bridge some of the existing gaps in the context of
climate change-related displacement.
VI. International Law Commission Draft Articles on the
Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters
Another international initiative which may provide the basis for
a new normative framework is the work of the International Law
Commission (“ILC”), a U.N. body called upon by states to further
the development of international law which has sought to establish
hard law to protect people displaced by disasters.128 After the failure
of several efforts in the 1980s to develop a binding legal framework
regulating humanitarian assistance for disasters outside armed
conflicts, the 1990s brought new attention to the topic,129 leading to
the elaboration of “Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the
Event of Disasters.”130 The ILC worked on the draft from 2007 until

content of the protection granted).
126 Climate Change Displacement and International Law: Complementary Protection
Standards, Paper Submitted for the U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees Expert Roundtable
on Climate Change and Displacement in Bellagio, It., at 118 n.126, U.N. Doc.
PPLA/2011/03 (May 2011).
127 See id. at 18–36 (noting the jurisprudence still requires significant development
before it will be fully applicable to climate-related displacements).
128 About the Commission, INT’L L. COMM’N, http://legal.un.org/ilc/work.shtml
[https://perma.cc/A8NA-J9G3].
129 Dug Cubie, An Enchanted Tool? Humanitarian Assistance and the ILC Draft
Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, 4–5 IRISH Y.B. OF INT’L L.
119, 132–34 (2009–10).
130 Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, INT’L L. COMM’N,
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2016 when it presented its draft articles and asked for comments by
states.131 In November 2018 the General Assembly “took note” of
the work of the ILC and in particular the comments received from
six states and agreed to schedule another discussion in 2020.132
The present 21 Draft Articles aim to frame an effective response
to disasters, detailing both the rights and obligations of affected
states and other international actors and define “disaster” as “a
calamitous event or series of events resulting in widespread loss of
life, great human suffering and distress, displacement, or large-scale
material, economic or environmental damage, thereby seriously
disrupting the functioning of society.”133 With this broad definition
covering both human-made and environmental disasters, the
Articles would not only be of relevance primarily for internal
displacement but also for the actions of international actors to
respond to such cases. That said, it is not entirely clear whether the
Draft Articles would also apply to slow-onset disasters and
comments, including by the IOM and the IFRC who argue that the
Draft Articles need further work.134
According to the Draft Articles, the affected state remains the
ultimate gatekeeper, although it shall not “withhold or withdraw
arbitrarily” consent to external assistance (Art. 14 II).135 The
considerable amount of time and resources devoted to these
negotiations reflect the general caution of states concerning the
assumption of new obligations for climate-change related
displacement that may infringe on their sovereignty.136 At this
http://legal.un.org/ilc/guide/6_3.shtml#srapprep [https://perma.cc/3WKW-G7XN]
131 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the
Event of Disasters, Ch. IV, ¶E, U.N. Doc. A/71/10 (Aug. 12, 2016).
132 Sixth Committee (Legal) – 73rd Session, Protection of Persons in the Event of
Disasters, GEN. ASSEMBLY OF THE U.N. (Nov. 13, 2018) [hereinafter Sixth Committee],
http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/73/disasters.shtml [https://perma.cc/KW9W-M2BT].
133 Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra note
131, at art. 3.
134 INT’L FED. OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC’YS, WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF
THE INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOCIETIES TO THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION OF THE “DRAFT ARTICLES ON THE PROTECTION OF
PERSONS
IN
THE
EVENT
OF
DISASTERS,”
http://legal.un.org/ilc/sessions/68/pdfs/english/pop_ifrc.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H3JGEM7C].
135 Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra note
131, at art. 13(2).
136 See id. at pmbl.
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point, it is difficult to tell if the Draft Articles will ever be included
in a new binding legal treaty submitted to states for their signature
and ratification.137 Several major states have deemed the existing
legal framework to be sufficient and see more practical value in
non-binding guidelines or in a framework of principles and
recommendations.138 It thus remains to be seen in which format the
Draft Articles will be finalized, and how they may shape
international law for those displaced by the effects of climate
change.
VII. Mini-Multilateral Initiatives: The Nansen Initiative and
the Platform for Disaster Displacement
Following the call of the 2010 UNFCCC Cancún Agreement to
increase cooperation and coordination regarding climate changerelated mobility, a number of governments and organizations
mounted efforts to increase the visibility of climate change-induced
displacement.139 One of these initiatives, the Nansen Conference in
June 2011, led to the development of the Nansen Principles,140
which among other things, called for a sounder knowledge base. It
also described the responsibilities of a broad range of stakeholders,
and highlighted the need for better preventive capacities and more
resilience.141
In particular, one of the principles identified an important
protection gap associated with cross-border mobility in the context
of disasters.142 As a concrete follow-up, the governments of Norway
and Switzerland launched a new effort at the UNHCR Ministerial
Conference in late 2012, known as the Nansen Initiative.143 This
effort was intended to be a state-owned, yet bottom-up and
137 See generally Sixth Committee, supra note 132 (voting to delay consideration on
Draft Articles for two years until 2020, after revising Draft Articles for over ten years
indicates potentially fatal delay).
138 See Cubie, supra note 131, at 138.
139 Jennifer Morgan et al., Reflections on the Cancun Agreements, WORLD RESOURCES
INST. (Dec. 14, 2010), https://www.wri.org/blog/2010/12/reflections-cancun-agreements
[https://perma.cc/38VM-WSM3].
st
140 The Nansen Conference, Climate Change and Displacement in the 21 Century
(June 7, 2011), https://www.unhcr.org/4ea969729.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD6Y-6DXU].
141 Id. at 5.
142 Id.
143 About Us, THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, https://www.nanseninitiative.org/secretariat/
[https://perma.cc/A5Q8-C4UD].
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participatory consultation process rather than an initiative solely
carried out by legal experts.144 It sought to build a better
understanding of cross-border displacement resulting from disasters
in the context of climate change and to develop a consensus around
applicable protection mechanisms.145 The term “in the context of
climate change” was used to get around to the difficulties of
ascribing causality for displacement to climate change alone.146
The Nansen initiative, under the leadership of its Special Envoy,
Walter Kälin and the support of a small secretariat,147 organized
various regional and sub-regional discussions in disaster hotspot
areas, bringing together representatives of countries of origin and
destination, civil society, and international organizations over the
course of 2013–2015.148
The results from these regional
consultations as well as from additional research commissioned by
the Nansen Initiative were synthesized at a global
intergovernmental consultation in 2015.149
The research and consultative processes produced a rich
collection of conceptual frameworks and good practices to be used
by governments and others and served as the background for the
development of the Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border
Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate
Change,150 which both establishes standards for the treatment of
affected people and for effective operational responses. Endorsed

144 THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, GLOBAL CONSULTATION CONFERENCE REPORT 26 (2015)
[hereinafter GLOBAL CONSULTATION REPORT], https://www.nanseninitiative.org/globalconsultations/ [https://perma.cc/R2SH-KAXT].
145 Id.
146 See GLOBAL CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 144 (“A fundamental concern is
that while refugees from war and persecution are protected by international conventions,
it is unclear what laws and policies protect people displaced across international borders
by extreme weather events.”).
147 About Us, supra note 143.
148 See GLOBAL CONSULTATION REPORT, supra note 144, at 26 (citing text
accompanying note 13).
149 Id.
150 THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, AGENDA FOR THE PROTECTION OF CROSS-BORDER
DISPLACED PERSONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE (2015)
[hereinafter Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context
of
Disasters
and
Climate
Change],
https://nanseninitiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/PROTECTION-AGENDA-VOLUME-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZYH5-KLJ3]
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by 109 government delegations in October 2015,151 the Agenda
addresses questions of admission and stay for cross-border disaster
displacement.152
Undoubtedly, the Nansen Initiative catalyzed government
attention and action around cross-border mobility in the context of
climate change. In May 2016, under the leadership of the
governments of Germany and Bangladesh, the Platform on Disaster
Displacement was established to follow up the work of the Nansen
Initiative and to implement the recommendations in the Agenda for
Protection.153
VIII. The International Climate Change Regime
Another possible source for development of legal norms on
climate change-induced mobility is the UNFCCC, which is the
major legal framework for international climate action.154 However,
UNFCCC was relatively late in considering how to deal with
migration and displacement stemming from the effects of climate
change.155
Only concerted advocacy before the sixteenth
Conference of the Parties (“COP”) in Cancún brought human
mobility more significantly into the UNFCCC negotiations.156
Thanks to these efforts, states adopted the Cancún Adaptation
Framework in late 2010, which recognized human mobility as a
form of adaptation to climate change.157 This decision led to an

151 Our
Response,
PLATFORM
ON
DISASTER
DISPLACEMENT,
https://disasterdisplacement.org/the-platform/our-response
[https://perma.cc/8CBR5L7P].
152 Id. For full text, see AGENDA FOR THE PROTECTION OF CROSS-BORDER DISPLACED
PERSONS IN THE CONTEXT OF DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 150.
153 Press Release, Platform on Disaster Displacement, Germany and Bangladesh
Commit to Address the Needs of People Displaced Across Borders in the Context of
Disasters and Climate Change (May 24, 2016), https://disasterdispacement.org/germanyand-bangladesh-commit-to-address-the-needs-of-people-displaced-across-borders-in-the
-context-of-disasters-and-climate-change [https://perma.cc/7YVQ-NLQK].
154 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, S.
Treaty Doc No. 102-38, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107.
155 See Walter Kälin & Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the
Context of Climate Change Normative Gaps and Possible Approaches, at 21, U.N. Doc.
PPLA/2012/01 (Feb. 2012).
156 See Koko Warner, Climate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in
the Context of the UNFCCC Climate Negotiations, at 7, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/02 (May
2011).
157 Cancun Agreements, supra note 30, at ¶14(f) (calling on parties to improve
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increase in research by the academic community, spurred the efforts
of the Nansen Initiative and others, and elevated the issue of
mobility within the international climate change regime.158 In
addition, an Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human
Mobility was established to provide technical assistance to the
Parties.159 Cancún thereby created important momentum and
legitimacy for the issue160 and potentially opened access to
international climate financing for mobility-related adaptation
measures.
Since the COP meeting in Cancún, migration, displacement, and
relocation figured more visibly in the climate change
negotiations.161 The Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and
Damage (“WIM”) associated with climate change was established
at the 19th meeting of the Conference of Parties and seeks, among
other things, to improve the knowledge base on the relationship
between climate change and migration, enhance cooperation among
states, and to provide technical support on approaches to address
loss and damage.162 The Advisory Group on Climate Change and
Human Mobility established in Cancún continues its support to the
associated WIM Executive Committee,163 and there is growing
adaptation efforts by, amongst other things, “[m]easures to enhance understanding,
coordination and cooperation with regard to climate change induced displacement,
migration and planned relocation, where appropriate, at national, regional and international
levels[.]”).
158 THE NANSEN INITIATIVE, supra note 144.
159 Recommendations from the Advisory Group on Climate Change and Human
Mobility, Human Mobility: In the Context of Climate Change UNFCCC – Paris COP-21
(Nov. 2015).
160 See Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 155, at 49.
161 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Rep. of the Conference of
the Parties on its eighteenth session, held in Doha from 26 November to 8 December 2012,
3/CP.18, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2012/8 (Feb. 28, 2013) (adopting decision entitled
“[a]pproaches to address loss and damage associated with climate change impacts in
developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate
change”).
162 THE WARSAW INTERNATIONAL MECHANISM FOR LOSS AND DAMAGE ASSOCIATED
WITH CLIMATE CHANGE IMPACTS, MAPPING HUMAN MOBILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE IN
RELEVANT NATIONAL POLICIES AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS 1 (2018) [hereinafter
MAPPING
HUMAN
MOBILITY
AND
CLIMATE
CHANGE],
https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/20180917%20WIM%20TFD%20I.1%20Out
put%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Y7H-YTKU].
163 Dina Ionesco, COP21 Paris Agreement: A Stepping Stone for Climate Migrants,
IOM (Dec. 23, 2015), https://weblog.iom.int/cop21-paris-agreement-stepping-stone-
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recognition by states that human mobility constitutes an adaptation
as well as a loss and damage issue.164
In 2015 the Paris Agreement was adopted, in which virtually all
states agreed for the first time on partially binding165 Intended
Nationally Determined Contributions (“INDCs”) to limit climate
change and its adverse impacts.166 A review of the INDCs submitted
indicate that about one-fifth mention human mobility, mostly by
those countries expected to be most affected by climate change.167
These references mainly focus on migration as adaptation, security
issues, and remittances as a contribution to climate action.168
Importantly, a Task Force on Displacement was created under the
Warsaw Mechanism to “develop recommendations for integrated
approaches to avert, minimize and address displacement related to
the adverse impacts of climate change.”169
This Task Force on Displacement brings together 13
representatives of international organizations working on the issue,
such as IOM, International Labor Organization (“ILO”), U.N.
Development Program (“UNDP”), and the UNHCR, as well as the
Platform on Disaster Displacement, civil society organizations, and
representatives of UNFCCC bodies.170 The Task Force has
developed a plan of action and produced a number of studies and in

climate-migrants [https://perma.cc/AYY7-MUSS].
164 Id.
165 Charlotte Streck et al., The Paris Agreement: A New Beginning?, 34 J. ENERGY &
NAT. RESOURCES L. 16 (2016). Due to political constraints in the USA and other countries,
not all of the agreement is considered legally binding, though the legal discussion
continues.
166 Id.
167 MAPPING HUMAN MOBILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, supra note 162, at 3.
168 Eva Mach & Mariam Traore Chazalnoel, Ahead of COP21 Intended Nationally
Determined Contributions Take Stock of Human Mobility Questions, IOM (Nov. 30,
2015),
https://weblog.iom.int/ahead-cop21-intended-nationally-determinedcontributions-take-stock-human-mobility-questions [https://perma.cc/9DGN-X2BB].
169 Migration, Displacement and Human Mobility, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/constituted-bodies/executive-committee-of-the-warsawinternational-mechanism-for-loss-and-damage-wim-excom/areas-of-work/migration-displacement-and-human-mobility [https://perma.cc/FKW9-2JYS].
170 See Membership - Task Force on Displacement, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/constituted-bodies/executive-committee-of-the-warsawinternational-mechanism-for-loss-and-damage-wim-excom/sub-groups/task-force-ondisplacement/membership [https://perma.cc/MN69-TKQ3].
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2018 its mandate was extended.171
While it is important that the issue of climate change-related
mobility is dealt with in the framework of the UNFCCC,
particularly as this is likely to be one of the main consequences of
climate change,172 situating the issue in the context of “loss and
damage” raises politically contentious questions, particularly in
considering liability and compensation.173 There is a reluctance
among some countries, particularly those who have been
historically significant carbon emitters, to discuss liability for their
actions in the context of displacement.174 Thus, while some have
called the inclusion of migration in the preamble of the Paris
agreement an “unprecedented breakthrough,”175 others have argued
that the UNFCC is not the adequate forum to deal with
displacement, particularly as the Framework faces difficulties in
moving forward on less sensitive core functions.176
On the other hand, others argue in favor of the potential of the
UNFCCC to “prevent and mitigate displacement in the context of
climate change[.]”177 In particular, the establishment of the WIM
could lead to discussion on vital funding questions.178 This is an
issue of great importance to countries which could face the need to
relocate communities away from areas damaged by the effects of
climate change.179 Whether or not the UNFCCC mechanisms,
including the Task Force on Displacement, are able to come up with
either new normative standards or concrete mechanisms to support
171 Task Force on Displacement, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/wimexcom/sub-groups/TFD#eq-1 [https://perma.cc/H2XA-RBMN].
172 See id. (describing U.N. climate policy designed to avert, minimize, and address
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change).
173 See Streck et al., supra note 165, at 35–36.
174 See Maxine Burkett, Reading Between the Red Lines: Loss and Damage and the
Paris Outcome, 6 CLIMATE L. 118, 118–29 (2016).
175 See Ionesco, supra note 163.
176 David Hodgkinson & Lucy Young, “In the Face of Looming Catastrophe”: A
Convention for Climate Change Displaced Persons, 1, 2–3 (2009),
http://www.ccdpconvention.com/documents/A%20Convention%20for%20Climate%20C
hange%20Displaced%20Persons%20(January%202012).pdf
[https://perma.cc/JE87K7SD].
177 ADVISORY GROUP ON CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN MOBILITY, HUMAN MOBILITY
IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 3 (2015).
178 See Jonathan Gewirtzman et al., Financing Loss and Damage: Reviewing Options
Under the Warsaw International Mechanism, 18 CLIMATE POL’Y 1076 (2018).
179
Id.
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governments dealing with increased migration, displacement, and
relocations stemming from climate change, it is indeed a positive
step that the climate change community is discussing issues related
to mobility.
IX. Building on Operational Guidance
Yet another approach to developing normative frameworks for
those displaced or otherwise affected by disasters is to build on the
framework and guidelines developed by international organizations
to guide operational response. In particular, the Operational
Guidelines on the Protection of Persons in Situations of Natural
Disasters180 provide a rights-based approach to protecting those
affected by disasters.181 This effort has its origins in the visit to Asia
following the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami by the Representative of
the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of Internally Displaced
Persons (“RSG”) who was concerned by the many human rights
violations he witnessed in the operational response to the disaster.182
In spite of the fact that unprecedented sums of money were raised
for the victims of the tsunami and hundreds of actors mobilized to
support the response, there was evidence of discrimination in
assistance, inadequate attention to gender, and a lack of protection
for many vulnerable groups.183 He called for the development of
general guidance on human rights in humanitarian settings,
applicable to IDPs but also to others who were not displaced but
who also faced protection concerns.184 In 2006, he presented draft
guidelines to the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (“IASC”) on
the Protection of Persons in Natural Disasters, which after field-

180 THE BROOKINGS-BERN PROJECT ON INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT, IASC OPERATIONAL
GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN SITUATIONS OF NATURAL DISASTERS
(2011) [hereinafter OPERATION GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN
SITUATIONS
OF
NATURAL
DISASTERS],
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IDPersons/OperationalGuidelines_IDP.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UCM8-7TMX].
181 See generally id. (providing the details of a human-rights based framework for
protecting those affected by natural disasters).
182 A WORKING VISIT TO ASIA BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 1, 7
(2005),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/IDPersons/Tsunami.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VE8W-Q9SD].
183 See id. at 7–8.
184 Id.
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testing, were revised and adopted by the IASC in 2010.185
The Operational Guidelines, the first guidance of its kind for
disaster settings, called for the incorporation of a human rights
approach to both disaster risk reduction and to recovery efforts.186
They emphasize that persons affected by natural disasters should
enjoy the same rights and freedoms under human rights law as
others in their country and not be discriminated against.187 The
Guidelines also reconfirm the central principle of the Guiding
Principles on Internal Displacement that national authorities have
the primary duty and responsibility to provide assistance to those
affected by natural disasters and to protect their human rights.188
The Operational Guidelines recognize that in the heat of an
emergency, it is important to prioritize the implementation of rights.
This means that in the initial days and weeks of emergency
response, some rights, such as the right to food, water, and medical
care take priority over other rights, such as the right to vote and to
freedom of movement.189
Like the Guiding Principles and other normative frameworks
surveyed in this Article, the Operational Guidelines have served to
raise awareness of the importance of a human rights approach in
disaster response.190 They are directed primarily to operational
agencies, including governmental disaster management agencies,
international organizations, and non-governmental organizations
involved in disaster response.191 They have also been used to
provide human rights guidance for disaster risk reduction and thus
can be a useful resources in the development of climate change
adaptation policies.192 Similarly, individual operational agencies,
such as the International Organization for Migration and the
International Federation of Red Cross Red Crescent Societies, as
well as the inter-agency cluster system have all developed policies

185 See OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN SITUATIONS OF
NATURAL DISASTERS, supra note 180.
186 See id. at 1–3.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id. at 3.
190 Id.
191 OPERATIONAL GUIDELINES ON THE PROTECTION OF PERSONS IN SITUATIONS OF
NATURAL DISASTERS, supra note 180, at 7–8.
192 Id. at 8–9.
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or guidelines which incorporate rights-based approaches.193 In
particular, considerable work has been done to develop guidelines
to prevent and respond to sexual and gender-based violence in
disaster settings.194 These kinds of operational guidelines do not
constitute international law,195 but they can serve as both catalysts
and building blocks for the development of laws and policies on
climate change mobility. They identify specific needs—such as the
need to prevent sexual and gender-based violence and to reunite
unaccompanied children with their families.196 These are needs that
should be upheld in any normative frameworks on climate changeinduced mobility.197 They underscore the relevance of international
human rights law at different stages of displacement. Because they
are based on concrete experiences by operational humanitarian
actors,198 they indicate relevant areas which should be addressed in
over-arching normative frameworks.
X. Promising Areas for Further Work
This Article has identified a number of efforts to develop
normative frameworks for the treatment of those who leave their
communities because of the effects of climate change. While it is
unlikely that the international community will adopt a legallybinding comprehensive international convention on such
movements, at least in the foreseeable future, the evidence suggests
that considerable work is underway. As it is likely that most
population movements resulting from climate change will occur
within state borders,199 it is important that further work be done to
193 See INT’L FED’N OF RED CROSS AND RED CRESCENT SOC’YS, OPERATIONAL
FRAMEWORK FOR INVOLVEMENT IN MIGRANT HEALTH AND CARE SERVICES 1, 5 (2016),
https://media.ifrc.org/ifrc/wp-content/uploads/sites/5/2016/12/Operational-HealthFramework-on-Migration.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQM9-ZP98].
194 See IASC, Guidelines for Integrating Gender-Based Violence Interventions in
Humanitarian
Action
(2015),
https://gbvguidelines.org/wp/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/2015-IASC-Gender-based-Violence-Guidelines_lo-res.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PKJ-JGHD].
195 44B AM. JUR. 2D International Law § 5 (2019).
196 INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., GUIDELINES FOR INTEGRATING GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE INTERVENTIONS IN HUMANITARIAN ACTION: REDUCING RISK, PROMOTING
RESILIENCE, AND AIDING RECOVERY 5 (2015).
197
Id.
198 See generally IASC, supra note 194 (providing data and concrete experiences that
underscore the guidelines’ recommendations).
199 See GROUNDSWELL REPORT, supra note 20.
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incorporate the existing standards, primarily the Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement, into national laws and policies applicable
to those who move because of climate change. More governments
at the national, state, and local levels should be encouraged to
review their existing laws and policies to either modify them or to
adopt new laws and policies to meet the challenges of responding to
larger movements of people resulting from climate change. In
particular, migration should be incorporated into national
development plans, climate change adaptation plans, and disaster
risk reduction policies. While a few governments have made such
efforts,200 the vast majority of governments of both developed and
developing countries have not yet put into place plans to respond to
increased migration resulting from climate change.201 There is a
tremendous amount of work to be done in this area and outside legal
experts have a key role to play in identifying issues and suggesting
new legal approaches. The Grantham Research Institute on Climate
Change and the Environment and Sabin Center for Climate Change
Law have a database of national laws and policies relating to climate
change which provides a useful source for reviewing related
national laws and policies and identifying countries where such
policies are lacking.202 Even without a comprehensive international
agreement, governments at all levels and countries can begin to
develop national laws which will make a difference in the lives of
those who have to move because of climate change. And the
development of a body of national legislation could be an important
catalyst leading to the development of more international
agreements.
Given an international agreement is unlikely, a second
promising area for normative development is at the regional level.
The Kampala Convention is presently the only binding regional
agreement which obligates states to prevent, respond to, and resolve
internal displacement stemming from climate change.203 Although
implementation of the Convention has been lacking,204 this is a case

See id. at 1–2.
See id.
202 See Climate Legislation– Countries, Regions, Territories, LONDON SCHOOL OF
ECON., http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/countries/ [https://perma.cc/E6F6-V98N].
203 Translating the Kampala Convention into Practice: A Stocktaking Exercise, 99
INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 365, 365 (2017).
204 Id. at 366.
200
201
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where advice of legal experts could be helpful. For example,
analysis of how a particular African government could incorporate
the provisions of the Kampala Convention into national law or
suggestions of a monitoring mechanism to measure compliance
with the Convention could contribute to strengthening normative
frameworks generally. In the Pacific Islands, strong regional
organizations could take the lead in developing policies on climate
change-related migration in the region.205 There are many regional
processes, including the regional consultative processes on
migration, usually led by IOM which could provide the forum for
discussion of possible regional normative frameworks for dealing
with environmental migration and development.206 For example,
under the auspices of the Platform for Disaster Displacement, work
has begun on a new non-binding regional agreement on crossborder disaster displacement in South America.207 These offer
promising opportunities for the development of both binding law at
the regional level and for non-binding frameworks and agreements
which could eventually lead to the development of new law.
At the global level, while it is unlikely that a comprehensive
legal instrument on climate change induced mobility will be
adopted, there are processes underway, such as the Platform on
Disaster Development, the International Law Commission, and the
UNFCCC processes on displacement, which are slowly but steadily
building up a body of norms and principles which could serve as the
basis for a new legal convention on treatment of climate change
migrants when the time is more auspicious.208 Some of these

205 See COSMIN CORENDEA, MIGRATION & HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WAKE OF CLIMATE
CHANGE: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE OVER THE PACIFIC, UNU-EHS PUB. SERIES 2 (2017).
206 See Regional Consultative Process on Migration, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION,
https://www.iom.int/regional-consultative-processes-migration [https://perma.cc/J53MEK2K].
207 Press Release, Platform on Disaster Displacement, South American Countries
Now Have a Non-Binding Regional Instrument on the Protection of Persons Displaced
Across Borders and on the Protection of Migrants in Disaster Situations (Nov. 30, 2018),
https://disasterdisplacement.org/south-american-countries-now-have-a-non-bindingregional-instrument-on-the-protection-of-persons-displaced-across-borders-and-on-theprotection-of-migrants-in-disaster-situations [https://perma.cc/VK5Z-43VA].
208 See generally Enhance the Use of Identified Effective Practices, PLATFORM ON
DISASTER DISPLACEMENT, https://disasterdisplacement.org/enhance-the-use-of-identifiedeffective-practices [https://perma.cc/9L6V-CJFY] (identifying effective practices that the
organization is attempting to enhance and strengthen); U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change, Rep. of the Executive Comm. of the Warsaw Int’l Mechanism for Loss
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initiatives, such as the Platform for Disaster Displacement and the
Migrants in Countries in Crisis (“MICIC”)209 provide guidance for
specific groups of people, namely cross-border disaster displaced
and migrants caught up in crises in other countries, including natural
disasters.210 MICIC, like the Platform on Disaster Displacement, is
a state-led initiative which developed comprehensive guidelines and
training materials for governments to prepare for such situations.211
Although these “mini-multilateral initiatives” (so-called because
rather than bringing in all 193 U.N. member states212 they have been
developed by those countries with a particular interest in an issue)
are not comprehensive, they do offer useful guidance in particular
situations.213 These less-than-comprehensive approaches actually
represent a creative and realistic response to the fact that many
different types of people are likely to move because of the effects
of climate change. As noted earlier, an individual displaced by a
hurricane in the United States is likely to have very different needs
than a Somali pastoralist whose seasonal migrations are affected by
climate change, or a Nigerian migrant caught up in a monsoon in
Bangladesh.
Finally, there is a golden opportunity in the December 2018
adoption of the Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular
Migration.214 The Compact, also a non-binding agreement,215 makes
specific commitments to address the drivers of environmental
mobility and to develop policies to uphold the rights of those
affected by these movements.216 It also offers an entry point for
finding solutions for those who might not be able to move—the so-

and Damage Associated with Climate Change Impacts, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/SB/2017/1/Add.1 (2017).
209 See MIGRANTS IN COUNTRIES IN CRISIS INITIATIVE, GUIDELINES: TO PROTECT
MIGRANTS IN COUNTRIES EXPERIENCING CONFLICT OR NATURAL DISASTER (2016).
210 See id. at 3.
211 See id.
212 See
Member States, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/memberstates/index.html [https://perma.cc/2M4G-YLYH].
213 See Moises Naim, Minilateralism, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Jun. 21, 2009),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/21/minilateralism/ [https://perma.cc/WE38-EY27].
214 Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and
Regular Migration, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.231/3 (Dec. 10–11, 2018).
215 See id.
216 See id.

2019

CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION

459

called “trapped populations”—and for using other migration
pathways for safe and orderly migration as a way to reduce the risk
of disasters and adapt to the slow-onset disasters.217 The Global
Compact represents, for the first time, an international consensus on
developing new ways of addressing the urgent needs of those
displaced by environmental or climate change.218 The fact that the
Global Compact for Migration includes these provisions is due to
the hard work of civil society organizations as well as to the interests
of states at risk from the effects of climate change.219 Among its
provisions for follow-up and implementation, the Compact includes
a new capacity development mechanism which could be used to
provide technical support to governments, and to develop new laws
and policies to deal with climate change-induced mobility. It is too
early to tell if the Global Compact for Migration will live up to its
ambitious affirmations and objectives, but it is clear that it offers yet
another “hook” for legal experts and others concerned with climate
change as a driver of migration to develop new approaches and
standards.220
Given the reality of human-induced climate change and the
certainty that even more people will leave their communities
because of its effects,221 further work is needed to create adequate
normative frameworks to ensure that the rights of those who move
are upheld.

217 See SUSAN MARTIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL COMPACTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
DRIVERS OF MIGRATION (2018); ALICE THOMAS & MARK YARNELL, REFUGEES INT’L,
ENSURING THAT THE GLOBAL COMPACTS ON REFUGEES AND MIGRATION DELIVER (2018).
218 See THOMAS & YARNELL, supra note 217, at 5.
219 See id. at 2.
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